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Eastern Challenges for Josep Borrell – 
and the EU by Milan Nič and Cristina Gherasimov
As the European Union’s next designated HR/VP, Josep Borrell will have to deal with 
major global challenges and the EU’s internal travails to shape foreign policy more 
assertively. In particular, two flash points on the EU’s doorstep – the eastern Ukraine 
and Serbia-Kosovo – will be early tests of Borell’s ability to enhance the Union’s ability to 
project influence as a global power and help build its capacity for strategic autonomy. 
If the European Parliament approves Josep Borrell as the 
next High Representative of the Union for Foreign Af-
fairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European 
Commission (HR/VP), he will face an imposing list of 
tasks. Unlike other conflict situations in Eastern Europe, 
the eastern Ukraine and Serbia-Kosovo are likely to be 
on his agenda from his first week in office despite the 
fact that both were previously outside of his domain as 
Spanish foreign minister. True, the mission letter by Ur-
sula von der Leyen, designated president of the Europe-
an Commission, doesn’t even mention either flash point. 
But, if not handled well, these two challenges will have 
far-reaching negative implications for the EU’s “capacity 
to act autonomously and promote its values and interests 
around the world,” to quote from that letter, which sets 
this objective among Borrell’s main tasks.
Conflict in Eastern Ukraine:  
A New Momentum
Under former President Petro Poroshenko, relations 
between Ukraine and Russia were tense and a settlement 
on the Donbass was difficult to envision. Now, Ukraine’s 
recently elected president, Volodymyr Zelensky, is 
creating new momentum by calling for the revival 
of peace talks with Putin’s Russia and aiming to stop 
the war in the region by the end of his mandate. The 
current dynamics between Kyiv and Moscow present a 
cautious window of opportunity for the HR/VP to act 
more assertively and help the EU contribute to a peaceful 
settlement of the conflict, which would consequently 
elevate the EU’s role in addressing security challenges 
in its eastern neighborhood. Intensive diplomatic 
preparations are already underway for a new summit in 
the so-called Normandy format, which, in addition to 
Ukraine and Russia, also includes Germany and France, 
and uses the 2015 Minsk Agreements as a basis for settling 
the conflict. Initial breakthroughs in the peace talks 
might even be achieved before Borrell moves into his new 
position in Brussels. 
This conflict and its new dynamics present a particular 
challenge for Borrell. So far, the EU and its HR/VP have 
not been included in the Normandy format. Unlike their 
active role in recent talks over the nuclear deal with Iran, 
the EU’s foreign ministers – including Borrell as Spanish 
foreign minister – have supported Germany and France in 
their negotiations on Ukraine indirectly, relying on their 
diplomacy to be on board. 
Still, this current constellation can be an opportunity 
for a fresh start if Borrell considers the following. First of 
all, he should not ask to re-open the Normandy format. 
Any alteration risks further alienation of the conflicting 
parties and opens doors to competing demands. Kyiv, for 
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instance, prefers to have the United States included in 
the format, while Moscow has floated the idea of invit-
ing  China to join if it is extended. Secondly, the next  HR/
VP will have to deal with the consequences of recent ma-
neuvers towards Russia by French President Emmanuel 
Macron who is striving to “bring Russia back in” closer 
to Europe as a response to increased global geopolitical 
competition. 
Moreover, in order to live up to what his mission letter 
promises, Borrell should provide a longer-term strategic 
approach and conduct a thorough reassessment of the 
EU’s division of labor ahead of the anticipated conflict 
resolution in the Donbass. While Laszlo Trocsanyi, as 
the designated new commissioner for enlargement 
and neighborhood policy, will be in charge of Ukraine, 
including funding, he is, in theory, expected to “work 
under the guidance of the high representative/vice-
president,” as specified in the aforementioned mission 
letter. In practice, however, it will be challenging for the 
next HR/VP to establish guidance over the European 
Commission’s work in eastern Ukraine, as well as in the 
Western Balkans. Much depends on how much backing 
Borrell can win from von der Leyen and the EU capitals 
for a larger role for the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) in this regard. 
EU’s Russia Portfolio:  
Developing the HR/VP’s Role
If there is progress toward a peace settlement in eastern 
Ukraine, then, by default, the future of EU sanctions 
on Russia will be on the table – an explosive, divisive 
issue among the EU-28 that the next HR/VP will have to 
deal with. This also opens up a more systemic problem: 
the lack of a common approach among the EU capitals 
towards Russia. 
The annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern 
Ukraine in 2014 has led to a deep political crisis between 
Russia and the West. While the EU and its member states 
reconsidered relations with Russia in 2016 by putting 
forward the “Mogherini principles” to guide EU-Russia 
relations, these principles cannot replace a well-
coordinated policy. Because the EU lacks a comprehensive, 
assertive stance on Russia, the Kremlin’s hawkish 
intrusiveness has further corroded the domestic politics 
of individual EU member states. Further tensions have 
emerged around Russia’s financial support of populist and 
anti-European parties in EU member states, as well as its 
active interference in some national elections. The EU’s 
weak compromise-based approach has created a vacuum 
that each member state fills as it sees fit – a perfect recipe 
for Russia’s further pursuit of its divide et impera principle. 
If the present level of EU unity on Russian sanctions also 
starts to crumble, it will be an uphill battle for Borrell to 
coordinate policy. The HR/VP is in a unique position be-
cause he participates in European Council meetings, where 
the topic of Russian sanctions are regularly raised every 
six months. Both German Chancellor Angela Merkel and 
French President Macron always report to the European 
Council on the current state of play. So, if Borrell wants 
to make sure that he has full EU backing on Russia and 
Ukraine, he should raise related issues in these meetings, 
making clear what he intends to do and expressly asking 
for political support. As a veteran Spanish socialist with a 
more assertive approach to Russia’s portfolio, Borrell could 
guide a new process of building consensus and coordinat-
ing the EU’s future Russia policy based on the principle of 
Europe’s strategic autonomy. 
Serbia-Kosovo: Restarting Dialogue,  
Improving Implementation
Borrell’s credentials for shaping policy are much stronger 
on Serbia-Kosovo, where he has a direct mandate to act 
on behalf of the entire EU-28, as well as to coordinate 
with the United States and other powers. 
However, the EU-facilitated dialogue between the 
long-term Balkan adversaries that started in 2011 un-
der HR/VP Catherine Ashton has – under her successor 
and Borell’s predecessor Federica Mogherini – recently 
reached a dead-end. An early challenge for Borrell will 
be to present a credible plan on how to overcome this 
current stagnation and get Serbia and its former province 
back on track toward a legally binding agreement that 
fully normalizes their relations. 
In mid-2018, Serbian and Kosovar Presidents Aleksandar 
Vucic and Hashim Thaci tried to overcome the impasse 
through secret negotiations on a deal that would have 
included exchange of territories and Belgrade’s recognition 
of Kosovo as a state. These negotiations were held with 
HR/VP Mogherini’s encouragement but little transparency. 
The proposed “land swap” – northern Kosovo, which is con-
trolled by ethnic Serbs, in exchange for southern Serbia’s 
Presevo Valley, which is populated mostly by ethnic Alba-
nians – wound up producing more tensions and divisions 
within the Balkans, in Kosovo, and among EU members. 
These escalating tensions prompted German Chancellor 
Merkel to call an improvised Balkan summit in Berlin last 
April, which was co-hosted with French President Macron. 
While the summit did not reach its objective of restarting 
the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, it at least helped calm the situ-
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ation. An important development since then has been the 
resignation of Kosovar Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj, 
who had imposed tariffs on goods from Serbia and, in 
doing so, had made further talks impossible. Kosovo is 
now facing snap elections on October 6, 2019. A follow-up 
Balkan summit in Paris was cancelled until further notice.
As a first step after the hearing of the European Parlia-
ment to confirm him, Josep Borrell should send a clear 
signal to Germany, France, and other key actors that he 
will prioritize Serbia-Kosovo and make future talks more 
transparent. He should also expand and strengthen the 
small EEAS team in charge. Furthermore, as a Catalo-
nian-born politician who is against the independence 
of his own region, Borrell will need to send an early 
signal that he can move beyond his personal identity to 
strengthen European perspectives on Kosovo, which 
Spain does not recognize as a state – one of only five EU 
member states that do not. 
Secondly, Borrell might have time on his side on this 
issue. The most opportune window for restarting talks 
might not come before early 2020, once a new Kosovar 
government is formed and it can negotiate a common 
platform with President Thaci. (After the last elections, 
it took Kosovo three months to form a government.) An 
unfolding domestic development in Serbia may also bring 
snap elections there in spring. In addition, the larger 
regional situation will become more uncertain if the 
next EU summit in mid-October ends without Northern 
Macedonia and Albania getting a date to start EU acces-
sion talks. But that doesn’t mean that Borrell should not 
be proactive from the start.
Thirdly, given Borrell’s lack of previous Balkan experi-
ence, he would be well advised to delegate the Serbia-
Kosovo portfolio to a special representative. Borrell 
should select a political and/or diplomatic heavyweight 
of the caliber of a former foreign or prime minister, who 
is backed by the Quint (the main diplomatic format in the 
Western Balkans), as well as accepted by both Belgrade 
and Pristina. As such, Borrell’s representative could be 
also a partner for the newly appointed US special envoy, 
Matt Palmer, who has said repeatedly that it is his priority 
to get both sides back to the negotiating table. 
If a special EU representative is named, the HR/VP’s 
tasks would be to provide strategic guidance and nec-
essary resources, and to report back to the European 
Council – rather than getting bogged down in the details 
of actual negotiations.
Strategic Autonomy for the EU Starts at 
Home 
The next HR/VP should remind EU leaders that the Euro-
pean Union’s quest to build the capacity for strategic au-
tonomy starts at home – as well as on its external borders. 
Despite a broad portfolio assigned to him, Josep Borrell 
will not have the luxury of choosing his own priorities. He 
will also have to partly share some of them with the new 
commissioner for neighborhood and enlargement. Yet, in 
order to enhance the EU’s ability to project influence as a 
global power, Borrell will have to actively engage on two 
strategic challenges at the EU’s eastern and southeast-
ern borders: settling the conflict in eastern Ukraine and 
restarting the process of normalizing relations between 
Serbia and Kosovo. Both issues are likely to become his 
early tests as the EU’s incoming HR/VP.
The paradox of the European Union’s institutional 
set-up is, however, that – although Borrell, as HR/VP, will 
be formally mandated by the Foreign Affairs Council – he 
will need backing from the European Council on top 
foreign policy issues. Especially on the Donbass, he will 
be at the mercy of German and French leaders and their 
willingness to let the HR/VP and the EEAS that he leads 
into the game.
Milan Nič heads the Robert Bosch Center for Central and 
Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia at the German 
Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). 
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